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"It is perhaps unfortunate that a lawyer's theoretical duty to justice and to the
public good has been so totally overwhelmed by a duty of loyalty to a client, but this
seems unlikely to change any time soon."' The legal profession has both public
duties to society and private duties to advance the interests of its clients in the best
way possible. Nowhere is the conflict between the two more evident than in the
securities laws. The Securities Exchange Act of 19342 ("the Exchange Act") was
enacted principally to protect the public from the many dangers of the securities
markets, but the practical impact may not be as noble.
InRubin v. Schottenstein, Zox, & Dunn, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a law firm which both misrepresented material facts and made material
nondisclosures was not liable to the investors that their clients defrauded because
there was no reasonable reliance by the investors on the attorney's
misrepresentations and no duty to disclose to the investors.3 This case provides a
prime example ofthe conflict between public and private duties. By focusing on the
private duties of the attorney to protect client confidences and diligently pursue
client objectives, attorneys are allowed to act in ways that are contrary to the
general public duties of the Securities Acts: honesty, justice, and fairness.
This Note will show that the current approach to attorneys' liability for
nondisclosures under section 10(b) of the Exchange Ac ("Section 10(b)" or
"10(b)") is not enough. It allows attorneys to omit material facts (nondisclosure),
lowers the reputation of the legal profession as a whole, and is inconsistent with the
major goals of the Securities Acts,5 which are to ensure fair and honest markets6
and protect investors.
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University. I would like to thank Professor Hannah Buxbaum for her comments and suggestions
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1. RobertA. Prentice, Locating the "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line Between
Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 768 (1997)
(footnote omitted).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. IMI 1997).
3. 110 F.3d 1247,1257 (6th Cir.), vacated, 120 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 1997) (en bane), rev'd
on reh'g, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing the summary judgment for the defendants).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
5. The use ofthe term "Securities Acts" in this case refers to both the Securities Act of 1933
("Security Ace) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").
6. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2,15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
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Part I of this Note presents an introduction to liability under Rule 10b-5 of the
Exchange Act7 ("Rule 10b-5" or "10b-5") and Section 10(b). Part II looks at the
typical situations in which attorneys may be held liable under Rule 1 Ob-5 and the
various duty tests currently in use, their strengths and weaknesses, and how they
incorporate policy concerns. Part ImI addresses the specific policy concerns both for
and against expansion of attorneys' duties under Section 10(b), including the policy
behind the Exchange Act, attorneys' ethical obligations, and liability under other
areas of the Securities Acts. Finally, Part IV suggests a modification of the current
tests to create a uniform test for all circuits which furthers the purpose of the
Exchange Act.
I. CuRRENT SECTION 10(b) LiLmrrY
This Part of the Note will provide an introduction to the basics of Rule lOb-5.
These basics include the elements the plaintiff must prove to bring a private cause
of action under Rule 1Ob-5. Also, the distinction between primary and secondary
liability will be discussed. This is important because with the elimination of
secondary liability,8 an attorney must be found primarily liable to have violated Rule
10b-5.
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides the basis for the anti-fraud litigation
under the act. It makes it unlawful for any person "[t]o use or employ ... any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors."9 Rule 1Ob-5, which was enacted
under the authority of Section 10(b), specifies a list of acts that are "manipulative
devices" including "(1) [t]o employ any device ... to defraud, (2) [t]o make any
untrue statement of a material fact.., or (3) [t]o engage in any act.., which...
would operate as a fraud.., upon any person.""
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 are the catch-all anti-fraud provisions of the
Exchange Act. While there are considerable procedural and substantive elements
to a lOb-5 cause of action," a suit under Rule lOb-5 can be brought by any
purchaser or seller of a security against anyone who uses manipulative devices in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.' A typical Rule 1Ob-5 suit
involves a claim by an investor against the issuer of a security based on a decline
in stock price caused by over-optimistic expectations about the future performance
of the company or stock, failure to disclose negative facts about the company, or
misrepresentations by the companies about their current performance. While issuers
are usually the main defendants in these cases, liability can also fall on the
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
8. See discussion infra Part I.B.
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
11. See discussion infra Part IA.
12. See Robert J. Haft, Liability ofAttorneys andAccountants for Securities Transactions,




accountants, the underwriters, and, our focus here, the attorneys involved in the
security transaction.
A. Elements
While neither the Exchange Act nor the rule specifically authorizes one, a private
cause of action has been recognized under Section 10(b) since 1946.3 The
Supreme Court acknowledged the private right of action in 1983, relying on almost
forty years of lower court decisions. 4 Under current law, the plaintiff must prove
seven elements to show the defendants are liable for a violation of Rule lOb-5. Rule
lob-5 has three sub-sections that involve different varieties of fraud. 5 Because
suits against attorneys are generally brought under subsection (2), this will be
discussed in detail. In order to state a case under Rule lOb-5(2), there must be (1)
a misrepresentation, omission, or nondisclosure, (2) in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, (3) a duty to disclose, (4) scienter, (5) materiality,
(6) reliance, and (7) injury.'6
First, a distinction must be made between misrepresentations, material omissions,
and nondisclosures 7 because suits under each have different basic elements.
Misrepresentations occur when the defendant makes a false statement whereas
omissions are when the defendant states partial truths.'" Omissions occur when a
defendant states part of a fact, but omits material information that is necessary to
keep the revealed information from being misleading.'9 These two types of fraud are
specifically prohibited in the language of Rule 10b-5." Nondisclosures occur when
the defendant fails to disclose material information in its entirety and are also
actionable under lOb-5(2)." In order to satisfy the first element of Rule 1Ob-5, the
13. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (ED. Pa. 1946).
14. See Herman & MacLan v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,380 (1983).
15. Rule 1Ob-5(1) and (3) will not be the focus of this discussion, but it should be noted that
there are different requirements for those causes of action.
16. This formulation of the elements is one of several, listing anywhere from 4 to 7 elements.
See Michael J. Kaufinan, Living in a Material World: Strict Liability Under Rule IOb-5, 19 CAP.
U.L.Rgv. 1, 2 (1990); Prentice, supra note 1, at 699; Kevin P. Roddy, Money, MailFraud, and
Malpractice: Attorney's Liabiliy in Financial Transactions, in MisERY, MALPRACTIcE, AND
MAILFRAuD: LAWYERS' PROFSSlONAL LIAmLrry N THE 90's, at 341,346 (ALl-ABA Course of
Study, Oct. 17, 1991); Jerold S. Solovy et al., Potential Liability of Attorney's in Securities
Transactions, in SEcuRrrms LmGATION: 1987 PRosEnoN AND DEFENSE STRATEGms 621,
626-27 (PLI Litig. &Admin. Practice Series No. 335., 1987).
17. The focus of this Note is nondisclosures, although some courts might refer to the
withholding of information as omissions, and opinions do not always clearly distinguish between.
the three violations. Classifying between the three types can become important because the
elements for a cause of action are altered in a nondisclosure claim. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128,153-54 (1972).
18. See Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 627-28.
19.Seeid. at 629.
20. The Rule states that "[ilt shall be unlawful... [tlo make any untrue statement... or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in-order to make the statements... not misleading." 17
C.F.. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
21. See Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 629.
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defendant must make either a material misrepresentation, omit a material fact, or
completely fail to disclose a topic of material importance (nondisclosure).22
Secondly, the misrepresentation, omission, or nondisclosure must be in
connection with the sale or purchase of a security. The "in connection with"
language comes directly from the rule itself" and has been interpreted to mean
everything from the information must be "reasonably calculated to influence the
investing public"24 to the fraud must touch the security.25 A more widely accepted
definition of the "in connection with" requirement relies on a contextual approach
and requires the court to examine the transaction to determine whether the person
claiming fraud was actually engaged in securities activity, and whether the
investment activity was essential to the fraudulent scheme.26 As a procedural
requirement, there must also be a purchase or sale of a security.2
In order for the defendants to be liable they must have a duty to the investor. The
duty element for misrepresentations is supplied by the common law. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts states this duty as follows:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in
reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss
caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.'
Because omissions make a representation false, the same common law duty applies.
In nondisclosure cases, however, the question of duty becomes difficult.29 Courts
have determined that there must first be a duty to disclose in order for the
nondisclosure to be fraudulent.30 The general approach to nondisclosures under
Rule 1Ob-5 has been the traditional caveat emptor, absent a fiduciary relationship.
The use of this approach allows attorneys to violate commonsense ideas of fairness
and honesty in reliance on their private duties. The early common law found a duty
in the very limited cases where a fiduciary relationship or privity existed.3 The
courts reasoned that when one party expects the information to be disclosed, the
lack of disclosure is a fraudulent act. However, in more recent years, courts have
used several different tests to determine when defendants have a duty to disclose.32
Because of the wide variety of tests, very little is certain in the area of duties to
22. See id. at 627-29.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.101b-5.
24. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968).
25. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6,12-13 (1971).
26. For more information on the contextual analysis and the "in connection with" requirement
generally, see Texas GulfySulphur, 401 F.2d at 860, and JAMEs D. Cox ET AL., SEcuRrr s
REGuLATION 686-87 (1997).
27. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,755 (1975). The Court was,
in part affrming the Bimbawn v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), rule that the
Second Circuit had followed for twenty-three years. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 749. The
Court relied on the policy of avoiding "a danger of vexatiousness" in litigation to limit the
availability of Rule IOb-5 to purchasers and sellers. Id. at 739.
28. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 525 (1977).
29. For a detailed analysis of the duty question, see infra Part II.
30. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,228 (1980).
31. See id.
32. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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disclose, except that a duty must be found in order for the defendant to be liable for
nondisclosure under Rule 1Ob-5.
The fourth element of a cause of action under Rule 10(b)-5 is scienter. The
Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder determined that in order to be liable
under Section 10(b), the defendant must have "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 33 This changed the long existing rule that mere
negligence could be the basis for Section 10(b) liability and began a trend of
increased difficulty in bringing a successful Section 10(b) suit. While the Supreme
Court has never specifically ruled on the issue, most courts have held that
recklessness is enough to satisfy the scienter requirement.34
The fifth element is materiality. The Supreme Court defined materiality in TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway Inc. as "[ain omitted fact... [where] there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote . . . [and] the omitted fact would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder." 35 Under Rule l Ob-
5, the misrepresentation, omission, or nondisclosure must be material to the average
investor; the standard does not change based on the subjective views of each
individual. If the information (or lack thereof) would not have altered the "total
mix' of information available to the investor, then it is not actionable no matter how
egregious.' 6
Reliance is the sixth element of a successful cause of action under Rule 10(b)-5.
In cases of misrepresentations and omissions, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant's action induced them to purchase or sell the security. 7 However, if the
case involves a nondisclosure, there is a presumption that the nondisclosure was
relied upon. As the Court inAffiliated Ute Citizens v. United States stated, "All that
is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable
investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision.1
3
1
There is some question as to whether this can apply outside the face-to-face
transaction context.
In the context of misrepresentations and omissions, plaintiffs often rely on
methods other than individual reliance to ease their burden of proof on the reliance
33.425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). In this ease, the Court held that the defendant, Ernst &
Ernst, was not liable for its negligent failure to use appropriate auditing procedures because it
lacked the intent to defraud that was necessary in a Section 10(b) suit See id. at 193. More
specifically, the Court determined that Ernst & Ernst was negligent in its failure to discover the
'mail"rule, a rule that only the president of the bank could open the mail of the bank. Id. at 215.
The Court derived this intent component from the statute and the administrative history of Section
10(b). See id. at 201-14.
34. See Trust Co. v. N1.NP. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478,1490-91 (5th Cir. 1997); Croy v. Campbell,
624 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 1980); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1336-38 (9th Cir. 1978).
35.426 U.S. 438,449 (1976). This case defined materiality in the context of Rule 14a-9, but
the definition has since been extended to Rule 10b-5. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
231-32 (1988).
36. See TSC lndusbies, 426 U.S. at 449.
37. See Latigo Ventures v. Laventhol & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322, 1325 (7th Cir. 1989).
38.406 U.S. 128,153-54 (1972).
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elements. The "fraud on the market"39 theory is the principle alternative to proving
individual reliance. The "fraud on the market" theory states that the investor
justifiably relied on the stock market and the idea that the market price is fairly set
without any market manipulation. 4' Because the company's statements are
presumed to be reflected in the price, the investors, in relying on that price, are
indirectly relying on the statements. There are other arguments which plaintiffs may
raise to help satisfy their reliance requirement including that they relied on the
reputation of the firm when making their investment decision.
41
Finally, an investor must show that the misrepresentation resulted in an actual
injury.4 Included in this requirement is that the price must have dropped (or risen
in cases where the plaintiff sold the stock) because of the material
misrepresentation, omission, or nondisclosure of the defendant.4 3 The standard
measure of damages is the difference in the price paid and the price at which the
transaction would have been consummated absent the fraud.44
While all of these elements are necessary in order for the plaintiff to establish
their cause of action, the duty element is the focus of suits against attorneys.
Attorneys, under current law, can conceal misleading information as long as they
owe no duty to the third party. This puts attorneys in the interesting situation of not
being required to disclose information even when their ethical and other obligations
would require it.4
B. Primary and Secondary Liability
Another important distinction in Rule lOb-5 lawsuits is between primary and
secondary liability. Before 1994, the majority of suits against attorneys were for
secondary as opposed to primary liability.46 Secondary (or aider and abettor)
liability typically involved three elements: (1) a primary violation by another party,
(2) the defendant had knowledge of the wrong, and (3) the defendant substantially
39. Developed in the Ninth Circuit case Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,906-08 (9th Cir.
1975), the theory has several variations in the different circuits. See, e.g., Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti
Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the fraud on the market theory is not
applicable under 10b-5(2)); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1156, 1160-62 (3d Cir. 1986); Harris
v. Union Elee. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 367 n.9 (8th Cir. 1986); Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust
Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 1985).
40. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-48.
41. If an investor uses the reputation theory, it puts the firm in the difficult position of having
to try and argue that it does not have a good reputation in the community. See Solovy et al., supra
note 16, at 642, for a more detailed discussion. Courts have also developed various tests to
determine if reliance is reasonable. See, e.g., Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910,
918 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing the Sixth Circuit's eight factor test).
42. See Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum Inc., 813 F.2d 296,301 (10th Cir. 1987).
43. See Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997).
44. See Alna Capital Assocs. v. Wagner, 758 F.2d 562, 566 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
45. See infra Part II.B.
46. See Ben D. Orlanski, Whose Representations Are These Anyway? Attorney Prospectus
Liability After Central Bank, 42 UCLAL. Rnv. 885, 891, 896 (1995); Patricia Blanchini, Note,
The Statement Someone Else Makes May Be Your Own: Primary Liability Under Section 10 (b)
After Central Bank, 71 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 767, 770-72 (1997).
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assisted in the violation. 47 Using these criteria, it was easier to prove that defendant
attorneys had assisted issuer fraud by directly communicating with investors and
failing to disclose what the issuer had omitted. Once a case had been made against
an issuer, it was not very hard to establish liability against the attorney on an aider
and abettor theory.
48
Establishing primary liability of an attorney involves proving the elements
discussed in Part L.A of this Note. However, many courts have not adequately
developed the distinction between primary and secondary liability. For most courts,
that distinction was not an issue until the Supreme Court in Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank ruled that there was no statutory basis for secondary liability under
Rule lob-5. 49 The Court's decision overruled thirty years of precedent and made the
distinction between primary and secondary liability of major importance."0 While
the law is not entirely clear, after Central Bank, it is apparent that attorneys can
still be held liable for their own misrepresentations under a theory of primary
liability. However, courts have been split over when liability will attach to attorneys
for the misstatements of others.5
II. THE DUTY DEFnED
This Part of the Note is devoted to a discussion of the duty element in detail.
First, I will discuss the typical situations in which an attorney may be held liable
under Rule l0b-5. Next, I will discuss the various duty tests and how attorneys may
be held liable under each of the tests.
47. See Prentice, supra note 1, at 707.
48. See Blanchini, supra note 46, at 771-72.
49. 511 U.S. 164,191 (1994).
50. Prior to Central Bank, aider and abettor liability in lOb-5 actions had been widely
recognized. See Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982,986 (10th Cir. 1992);
Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); K & S Partnership v.
Continental Bank, 952 F.2d 971,977 (8th Cir. 1991); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485,496
(4th Cir. 1991); Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290,300 (5th Cir. 1990); Schlitke
v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477,
1480 (1lth Cir. 1988); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir. 1987); Cleary v.
Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774,777 (1st Cir. 1983); ]IT v. Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir.
1980); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1978);
Brennan v. Midwestem United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673,680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affid, 417
F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
51. See Walco Investments, Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576, 1582-83 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(denying an attorney's motion for summary judgment based on false statements made by the client
but contained in a solicitation document prepared by the attorney); Employers Ins. v. Musick,
Peeler, & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381, 388-89 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (denying a motion to dismiss a
complaint alleging lOb-5 liability against attorneys for drafting a prospectus containing
misrepresentations and omissions). But cf. Anixter v. Hane-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that an accountant must actually make a misleading statement to be
liable); In re JWP, Inc. See. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a
defendant may not be liable under 10(b) unless it actually made a misrepresentation); In re MTC
Ele. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974,987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same). Attorneys can
still be held liable in Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC') enforcement actions under aider




There are five typical situations in which attorneys are found liable. The first of
these involves intentional fraud and deceit that could have been done by anyone, but
the wrongdoer happens to be an attorney. An illustration of this type of lOb-5
violation is SEC v. JakubowskiA.2 In Jakubowski, the defendant attorney was held
liable for attempting to use conversion rights that were unavailable to him."
Jakubowski tried to receive the benefits of these rights through fraud and
manipulation. 4
The second situation involves one of the principal targets of Rule lOb-5, insider
trading.55  There are two theories of insider trading, traditional and
misappropriation. 6 Traditional insider trading involves persons who breach a
fiduciary duty to the corporation by trading on inside information.57 Typically, these
insiders of the corporation include management and directors of the corporation, but
can include attorneys under the "temporary insider" theory.58 This theory states that
a person can be a temporary insider when the person becomes connected with the
management of the corporation.59 The temporary insider must have a relationship
with respect to the conduct of the corporation, the corporation must have an
expectation that the insider will keep the information confidential, and the insider
must have given assent to the expectation.6" These temporary insiders could include
attorneys for corporations and, therefore, the attorneys would violate lOb-5 if they
traded on inside information.
The second theory of insider trading that includes attorneys is the
misappropriation theory. The Supreme Court recently accepted this theory of
insider trading in United States v. O'Hagan and held an attorney liable for insider
trading.6' The misappropriation theory states that if a person steals information in
violation of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information and then trades
on the information, they have violated Rule 1Ob-S. 62 In O'Hagan, an attorney used
confidential information obtained by representing an acquiring company in a tender
52. No. 94 C 4539,1997 WL 156544 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31,1997), aff'd, 150 F3d 675 (7th Cir.
1998).
53. Id. at *1-5.
54. See id.
55. While originallythe SEC and Congress focused on section 16 of the ExchangeAct and the
full disclosure legislation to combat insider trading, see Cox ET AL., supra note 26, at 775-76, in
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), and SEC v. Texas GulfSulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were expanded to cover this conduct This
has continued until the present day.
56. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997); see also Texas GulfSulphur
Co., 401 F.2d at 847-58 (discussing insider trading generally).
57. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52..
58. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,655 n.14 (1983).
59. See id.
60. See id.; SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437,1439-40 (C.D. Cal. 1988).




offer to purchase stock in the target company.63 The attorney breached a duty of
confidentiality between him and his employer in violation of Rule 1Ob-5.64 After
O'Hagan, an attorney may be held liable under either a traditional or
misappropriation theory of insider trading.
The third situation involves an attorney's opinion letters. An opinion letter is a
letter drafted by the attorney that states that they worked on the transaction and it
is fair to the parties involved. Attorneys draft opinion letters for any number of
transactions and may be held liable for their own misrepresentations and reckless
analysis. InAckerman v. Schwartz, the defendant, Schwartz, was an attorney for the
promoters of a fraudulent tax shelter.6" He wrote an opinion letter that stated that
investors would be entitled to certain credits and reductions from the investment,
but also contained certain untrue "facts" about the investment." The Seventh
Circuit held that the attorney could be held liable even though he owed no duty to
the individual investors because he allowed the promoters to release his letter to the
investors' representatives.67 Attorneys have also been held liable in situations
where investors could reasonably be expected to rely on their opinion letters.68
The fourth situation where attorneys may be held liable is in the drafting of a
prospectus or other materials for an issuer. This liability involves attorneys in two
different roles. First, when the attorney is an officer or director of the issuer, as well
as the drafter of the prospectus, the attorney, as well as the other officers and
directors, can be held liable for the misrepresentations in the prospectus as a
control person of the issuer.69 The second situation occurs when the attorney is not
an officer of the issuer. These cases are more controversial,"0 but several attorneys
have been held liable for drafting false and misleading prospectus documents under
the theory that they failed to investigate the claims in the prospectus or that they
breached a duty to the investors.7 Failing to disclose can also involve failure to
63. Id. at 647-48.
64. See id. at 660.
65.947 F.2d 841,843 (7th Cir. 1991).
66. See id.
67.Seeid. at 848.
68. See id.; Kline v. First Western Gov't See., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994); Alter v.
DBLKM, Inc. 840 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D. Colo. 1993).
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994 , Bomarko, Inc. v. Hemodynamics, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1335,
1339 (W.D. lcih. 1993) (stating that the director who served as general counsel for a corporation,
reviewed corporate announcements, and drafted communications could be a control person and,
therefore, liable under securities law).
70. See Ted J. Fflis, Lawyer's Exposure to Liability in Securities Practice, in SEcURrrmS FOR
NON-SEcUaRrIs LAWYERS 613,628 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Oct. 10, 1996).
71. See Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 1991); Walco
Invesiments, Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576,1582 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Employers Ins. v. Musick,
Peeler, & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381,388-90 (SD. Cal. 1994); In re Flight Transp. Corp. See.
Litig., 593 F. Supp. 612,617 (D. Minn. 1984).
In addition to the approaches discussed in this Note, some courts have held that attorneys have
a limited duty to investigate. The Third Circuit stated, "[Ihis court has adopted a limited duty to
investigate and disclose when, by the drafter's omission, a public opinion could mislead third
parties?'Khe, 24 F3d at 491. This duty is limited to situations where the attorney does not have
a reasonable belief that information in its opinion letter or other documents is true (amounting to
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amend and correct documents that the attorney has previously submitted to the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") or potential investors.
72
The final situation in which attorneys may be held liable is for failing to disclose
material facts which are not connected with the documents. In Rubin v.
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, the attorney defendants allowed two investors to invest
in their client, a corporation, even though they knew prior lenders would look
poorly upon new capital infusions.7' Their failure to disclose to the potential
investors that any additional credit would cause the company's creditors to seize the
company's assets caused the investors to complete the transaction and lose their
investment. 4
B. Different Duty Tests
Under current lOb-5 doctrine, even with all the other elements of a cause of
action present, concealing misleading information is not actionable absent a duty
to speak." The duty element is thus particularly important in the case of attorneys
because under the current law, attorneys have very limited duties to anyone besides
their clients. For example, most attorneys do not have a fiduciary relationship with
their investors and, therefore, lack a duty to them. 6 Courts have applied several
different duty tests to determine when attorneys (or other defendants) may be held
liable. The scope of liability turns on the breadth (or narrowness) of the duty.
Therefore, a close examination of the various duty tests provides insight on what
elements are common to all the tests and where changes could be made.
The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the duty an attorney owes
to third parties in the 1Ob-5 context. Therefore, the thirteen courts of appeals have
taken widely varying approaches depending on the facts of the particular cases, the
circuit in which the case is brought, and characteristics of the particular defendant
and transaction.
The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have followed the typical, narrow
approach stating that in nondisclosure cases, attorneys owe a duty to third parties
only when they owe a fiduciary duty to the third party under non-securities law.7
Under this test, a defendant may be held liable for failure to disclose only in those
instances where there is a fiduciary relationship between the defendant attorney and
the plaintiffs. A fiduciary relationship is one that involves "confidence... reposed
recklessness). See id.
72.Seeln re Time Warner, Inc., 9 F.3d 259,260 (2d Cir. 1993); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.,
742 F.2d 751,751 (3d Cir. 1984); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1307 (5th Cir.
1977); Ross v. A.H. Robbins, Co., 465 F. Supp. 904,905 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 607 F.2d 545 (2d
Cir. 1979).
73. 143 F.3d 263,266 (6th Cir. 1998) (en bane).
74. See id.
75. See Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222,228 (1980); Michael J. Kaufman, Living
in a Material World: Strict Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1990).
76. See Chapter Vii Other Causes ofAction, 50 BAYLORL. REV. 761,795 (1998).
77. Se eg., Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469,472 (4th Cir.
1992); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1118 (5th Cir. 1988); Barker v. Henderson,
Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,495-96 (7th Cir. 1986).
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on one side and... [a] resulting superiority and influence on the other."78 In Schatz
v. Rosenberg, the defendant attorneys represented a purchaser who paid for two
companies owned by the plaintiffs with promissory notes.79 The defendants knew
that their clients were bankrupt, but failed to disclose this information to the
seller." The attorneys were found to be not liable to the plaintiffs because "no
fiduciary or confidential relationship existed between the two parties."81
The most common example of the existence of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship occurs when there are transactions with shareholders. If an insider-a
director, a member of management, or a majority shareholder-in" a corporation
does business with a minority shareholder, that insider has a fiduciary duty to the
shareholder.' Therefore, many attorneys will not be held liable because they do not
have a similar relationship with third parties, although they will be held liable to
their own clients. While this approach supplies a fair amount of certainty, it is also
almost an impossibly high burden for plaintiffs to meet with respect to attorneys and
may not be in line with the purpose of the Exchange Act."
The certainty allows easy prediction, but may have the "principal weakness...
[of] allow[ing] egregious wrongdoing to go unpunished and serious fraud-inflicted
injuries to go uncompensated." 4 This occurs because the attorneys have
perpetuated or allowed their clients to deceive innocent plaintiffs, the clients have
disappeared or filed for bankruptcy, and the attorneys have no duty to the victims.
It is also far from the certainty that some courts make it out to be. The common law
has supplied duties to speak in at least thirteen situations, not all of which are
applicable to securities law, but which illustrate that the fiduciary approach is not
uniformly accepted.8 These exceptions are based on the idea that the general rule
"reflects 'dubious business ethics." 8 6 Included among them are the duty not to tell
78. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 706 (S.D.N.Y.) (describing a fiduciary
relationship), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
79. 943 F.2d 485,488 (4th Cir. 1991).
80. See id.
81.Id. at 490.
82. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp 808, 828-29 (D. Del.), modified, 100 F.
Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951).
83. See infra Part MA
84. Prentice, supra note 1, at 727-28. Although this author was referring to a narrow test for
primary as opposed to secondary participation, the reasoning is applicable to the duty question.
85. See id. at 720 n.129.
86.Id (quotingW.PAGKEEONETrAT, PO5 AND KEAToN ON THE LAw oF TORTS § 106,
737-38 (5th ed. 1984)).
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half truths,8 7 the duty to update, 8 the duty to correct,89 the duty to speak if one has
a superior position or superior knowledge," and the duty to disclose where failure
to do so would strike a normal person as unethical.91
A second approach, the one followed by the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits,
is to look at who has the superior information in determining if one party has a duty
to disclose.' If one party has information that the other does not have (or could not
obtain) access to, this can be a factor to determine if the party must disclose the
information in order to avoid unfairness.93 This idea is closely related to common
law fraud concepts as explained in FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co.94 The court in that
case stated that "when the seller has without substantial investment on his part
come upon material information which the buyer would frnd either impossible or
very costly to discover himself, then the seller must disclose it."9
This theory has been most widely used in securities cases where the attorneys
prepared the offering circular or document with the nondisclosure. In Molecular
Technology Corp. v. Valentine, the attorneys were held liable for failing to disclose
in an offering circular prepared for a merger that certain shares of the corporation
were in escrow (among other things).96 The court stated that "a reasonable jury
could find that Synder [(the attorney)] knew certain information in the amended
offering circular was misleading and that Synder had a duty to disclose that
information to investors such as theplaintiffs under 10(b)/rule 1Ob-5."97 While the
court used direct contacts language,98 it based its decision on the fact that Snyder
87. See Dennis v. Thomson, 43 S.W.2d 18,23 (Ky. 1931); Smith v. Pope, 176 A.2d 321,324-
25 (N.H. 1961); Uptegraft v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 764 P.2d 1350,1353 (Ok. 1988).
88. See Tempo Tamers, Inc. v. Crow-Houston Four, Ltd., 715 S.W.2d 658,669 (Tex. App.
1986). While many circuits have limited the duty of attorneys to those with which the attorneys
have a fiduciary relationship, these same courts have found that a duty to update exists. This means
that when an attorney makes affirmative statements that later become false, the attorney has an
obligation to correct these misleading impressions. See Kline v. First W. Gov't See., Inc., 24 F.3d
480,491-92 (3d Cir. 1994).
89. See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 1997); Fitzgerald v.
McFadden, 88 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1937).
90. See Prentice, supra note 1, at 697 & n.129.
91. See Hand v. Dayton-Hudson, 775 F2d 757,759 (6th Cir. 1985); Southern Land Dev. Co.
v. Meyer, 159 So. 245,246 (Ala. 1935); Berger v. Security Pac. Info. Sys. Inc., 795 P.2d 1380,
1383 (Colo. Ct App. 1990); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68,71 (NJ. 1974); George Cohen
Agency, Inc. v. Donald S. Perlman Agency, Inc., 114 A.D.2d 930,932 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985);
Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95,107 (Wis. 1980).
92. See e.g., Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646,653-54 (9th Cir. 1988);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808,829 (D. Del.), modified, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del.
1951).
93. SeeRachman Bag Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 230,237 (2d Cir. 1995) (state
law); Central States Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405, 1409 (6th Cir. 1984)
(same).
94. 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989).
95.Id. at 619.
96. 925 F.2d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 1991).
97. Id.
98. See infra text accompanying note 100.
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drafted the merger documents and had knowledge of the false information.99 This
approach is certainly more inclusive than the strict fiduciary approach, but it lacks
specific guidelines and may be too broad in its coverage. Also, never allowing one
to take advantage of superior knowledge for business gain goes against a basic tenet
of the United States market economy.
There is another theory of duty, also espoused by the Sixth Circuit, that seeks to
hold responsible persons who had direct contact with the investors. The court in
SEC v. Coffey stated that "[a] duty to disclose naturally devolve[s] on those who
[have] direct contacts with 'the other side."""0 The courts have interpreted this
approach broadly to apply whenever a defendant drafts a prospectus or other
document This can be seen from SEC v. Washington County Utility District, where
the court stated that direct contacts did not need to involve physical contact, but
instead occurred if the attorney furnished information which was misleading
because of nondisclosure.' This provides a somewhat circular test. The courts
state that there is no duty to disclose in a document unless there are direct contacts,
while at the same time the direct contacts are supplied by the document, so there
will always be a duty.' 2
In an older line of cases, the Seventh Circuit focused on the reasonable
expectations of the investors. In Kohler v. Kohler, the court stated that a duty to
disclose under Rule lOb-5 should not extend beyond that required by the "exercise
of fair and honest business practices."0 3 Courts have looked at six factors to
determine what constitutes fair and honest business practices: (1) the nature of the
dealings between the parties, (2) the plaintiff's knowledge of the business, (3) the
plaintiff's business acumen, (4) the plaintiff's initiation of the transaction, (5) the
degree whichthe plaintiffwas concerned with obtaining full disclosure, and (6) the
plaintiff's familiarity with financial information concerning the corporation.0 4 In
dealings with unsophisticated plaintiffs, this idea of fairness could require more
honesty from attorneys. Although up until now, this analysis has been used only in
closely held corporations, it provides a basic theory that if there were expectations
of disclosure, the failure to disclose might constitute fraud and, therefore, a
violation of Section 10(b).0 5 There is an element of fairness and a focus on honest
business transactions in this test that pervades some business litigation.
Another way of interpreting the expectations test is to focus on whether, through
their representation of clients, the attorneys are impliedly representing that the
99. See Molecular Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d at 917-18.
100. 493 F.2d 1304, 1315 (6th Cir. 1974).
101.676 F.2d 218,223 (6th Cir. 1982). In this case, the defendantwas also an officer who had
signed the prospectus, however, later courts lowered the standard. See Atlantis Group Inc. v.
Rospatch Corp.,Nos. 1:90-CV-805, 1:90-CV-806, 1992 WL 226912 (W.D. Mich. July 8,1992).
102. See Orlanski, supra note 46, at 915.
103. 319 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1963).
104. See Steven A. Fishman, Duty to Disclose Under Rule lOb-5 in Face-to-Face
Transactions, 12 J. CoRP. L. 251,267 (1987).
105. This idea is similar to the theory espoused inAffliiated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972). In that case, the Court looked to what a reasonable person would consider




transaction is fair and honest. This theory argues that the investor is basing
investment decisions on the reputation of the firm and the actions of the attorneys. 6
Although closely related to reliance and the direct contacts test, this branch of the
expectations test focuses on the investor's expectation that the attorney would not
be involved in deceitful transactions.1 7 This relates to the description of attorneys
as "reputational intermediaries: someone paid to verify another party's
information.'2
08
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has developed a three-pronged test
focusing on accountant's liability that may be useful to analyze the potential liability
of attorneys. In Rudolph v. ArthurAnderson & Co., the court relied on whether the
accountant's information was superior to the investor's, whether the cost to the
accountant of revealing the information was minimal, and whether the cost to the
investors of keeping the information secret was large.' °9 The court used these
factors to hold Arthur Anderson liable under Rule lOb-5 aider and abettor liability
for failing to "blow the whistle" on its client who was intending to use investor's
funds for items other than those listed in the private placement memorandum."'
The final test is one developed in the Ninth Circuit case, White v. Abrams, which
has come to be known as the flexible duty test."' While this test is no longer
followed by the Ninth Circuit, it is followed on occasion by other circuits."' This
test applies five factors to the securities transactions to determine whether a duty
to disclose exists and the defendants will be liable. The factors are (1) the
relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant's access to the
information as compared to the plaintiff's access, (3) the benefit that the defendant
derives from the relationship, (4) the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff
was relying upon the relationship in making his investment decision, and (5) the
defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction in question."' In Roberts
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., the court looked to three of the factors to
determine that a law firm was not liable for its failure to include information that
another investor owned an interest in the property in a title opinion."4 The three
factors were (1) that the law firm was retained only with respect to specific issues,
106. See Prentice, supra note 1, at 733.
107. Phrased another way, visible participation by an attorney in the fraudulent scheme, even
though no actual contact with the investor occurs, can lead investors to believe the transaction is
legal and fair. See id. at 743-46.
108. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by BusinessLawyers: Legal Skills andAsset Pricing,
94 YALE L.J. 239,289 (1984).
109. 800 F.2d 1040, 1043-45 (11th Cir. 1986).
110. See id at 1045-56. There is the possibility that with the demise of aider and abettor liability
under Rule 1Ob-5 that this test may be outdated. See discussion supra Part LB.
111. 495 F.2d 724,735-36 (9th Cir. 1974).
112. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane)
(rejecting the flexible duty test because it embraces a negligence standard); Haft, supra note 12,
at 793; see also Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1330 & n.26 (8th Cir. 1991)
(applying the factors of the flexible duty test).
113. See Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1570 n.9.
114. 857 F.2d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 1988).
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(2) the plaintiff had equal access to the information, and (3) that the law firm did
not initiate the transaction."'
The flexible duty test has been criticized because parties are unable to determine
in advance if a duty exists, and because the duty varies based on the nature of the
plaintiff."6 While an element of predictability is useful to keep the markets running
smoothly, these two concerns can be said to apply to several other securities
laws.1
7
III. REASONS FoR AND AGAINST EXPANDING CuRRENT
LIBLITY
Current doctrine, under which attorneys are liable for omissions only in a narrow
range of cases, has both support and opposition."' First, the purpose of the
Exchange Act under which the rule was enacted and the intent of Congress must be
examined. Next, an examination of attorney's ethical obligations shows arguments
both for and against expansion of the liability provisions. Finally, a look at liability
for non-attorney professionals under the other provisions of the Exchange Act, as
well as attorney's liability under both the Securities and Exchange Acts, supports
stronger standards that would not allow attorneys to be a part of deceitful
transactions.
A. The Purpose of the Act
The purpose of the Exchange Act is stated in section 2: "For the reasons
hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities... are affected with a national
public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of
such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, . . . to insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions. . . ."'" From the
statutory language and extensive judicial interpretation, the purpose of the
Exchange Act has often been more broadly perceived to be to protect investors from
115. See id.
116. See Fishman, supra note 104, at 273.
117. For example, in private placement under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)
(1994), the SEC would not even issue opinion letters, and instead relied on vague judicial-made
doctrine to define a "sophisticated purchase?' and the amount of information that needed to be
made available to such purchasers. See Gregory K. Miller et al., Exemptionsfirom SecuritiesAct
Registration: Section 4(2), Regulation D, Rule 144A and Regulation S Offerings, in DonGu
DEALs 1999: UND mgrA DnGTNurs AND BOLTS OF TRANSAcTIONAL PRACCE 203, 205 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. BO-006V, 1999). In 1972, the SEC enacted
a safe harbor rule, Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1998). In order to rely on the statutory
exemption, an issuer must still deal with the vague definitions and blurry lines.
118. See Fishman, supra note 104, at 329 (arguing that courts should require a duty to disclose
in all face-to-face transactions based on a relationship that results in a justifiable expectation of
disclosure); Prentice, supra note 1, at 720-22 (arguing that more duty exceptions should be
recognized); see also Fiffis, supra note 70, at 619-20 (stating the traditional fiduciary duty
approach).
119. Securities ExchangeAct of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
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fraudulent and dishonest practices, 2 ' and to provide for full and fair disclosure of
information in the securities market:' The Exchange Act has both mandatory
disclosure" and anti-fraud provisions" to enact these goals. As one court stated,
"[a] fundamental purpose, common to securities regulation statutes, is to substitute
the philosophy of full disclosure for a philosophy of caveat emptor and to achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."'24 These
interpretations of the purpose of the Exchange Act call for a broad reading of the
provisions of Section 10(b), more protections for investors, and, therefore, higher
standards for attorneys.
Another purpose, although not specifically listed in the Act, which has been
relied on by the judiciary is the desire to prevent frivolous litigation.2 The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199526 contains several provisions which
illustrate this purpose, including the new rules concerning class actions.'27 The
desire to prevent frivolous litigation would lead to higher standards for plaintiffs
wanting to bring suit and may be inconsistent with higher standards for attorneys.
The legislature desires to preserve and protect the reputation of the courts and to
continue to keep them available for substantial claims and redresses."' The court
has relied on this purpose in several key decisions including Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, when it stated "that litigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a
danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general."' 29 This purpose behind the Securities Acts
supports an argument against higher standards for attorneys because the higher
standard would entail more litigation that could in part be frivolous.
B. Professional Responsibilities
A second factor that weighs into which duty to require of attorneys is the
standards of the legal profession as a whole. Attorneys, as members of a profession,
have certain duties and obligations to clients, courts, and the public at large. The
120. See United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549-50 (3d Cir. 1988).
121. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,335 (1967).
122. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (1998).
123. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
124. Chelsea Assocs. v Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929, 939 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d
1266 (6th Cir. 1975).
125. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
126. Pub. L. No. 104-67,109 Stat 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). In 1995,
Congress passed reforms to both the Securities and Exchanges Acts that were largely designed to
prevent the problems that were perceived with the rise of meritless class action litigation in the
securities context. See id.
127. See id. § 101, 19 Stat at 737-49.,
128. See STAFF OF SENATE SUBcoMM. ON SEC. OF COMM. ON BANKING, HousiNG & URBAN
AFFAiRS, 103D CONG., REPORT ON PRIVATE SEcurriEs LITIGATION 108 (1994); Joel Seligman,
The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REv. 438, 445-48 (1994).
129.421 U.S. 723,739 (1975). The caseis discussed further supra text accompanying note 27.
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model codes for professional responsibility, 3 ' the Multistate Professional
Responsibility Examination,' and the character and fitness elements of the bar
exams are all requirements to ensure that the legal profession upholds the highest
standard of honesty and fairness. Attorneys are officers of the court and, as such,
must represent the truth and fairness that are inherent in that institution. In fact,
there are severe sanctions for those attorneys who fall below acceptable standards
of conduct.
32
The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct sets out the
expectations for attorneys. The Preamble states in relevant part:
[1] A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and
a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality ofjustice.
[4] A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both
in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal
affairs....
i5] .". [A] lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession.'
These paragraphs set out the goals for attorneys in both their professional and
personal conduct and show that they should be held to the highest standards
possible. "[E]ven the law profession itself realizes that the courts are setting a
scandalously low standard for the conduct of corporate attorneys and that something
needs to be done to begin raising the level of expected behavior.""' An example of
low behavior of attorneys that is tolerated by the courts would be the original Rubin
v. Schottenstein, Zox, and Dunn decision where the attorneys were allowed to
misrepresent their clients to innocent investors. 3 '
More specifically, Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
specifically addresses an attorney's duty to disclose client's information. Rule 1.6
allows attorneys to reveal a client's information "to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary... to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death."' 36 However, there was a great
debate in the drafting of the Model Rules because a large contingent of the
American Bar Association ("ABA") wanted to change the words to read "to prevent
130. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1997); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1997). The Model Code was the generally accepted ethical guideline
before the enactment of the Model Rules. Some states, including Georgia, Nebraska, and Texas
still use parts of the Model Code. See STEPBEN GnLERs & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF
LAwYERs: STATuTES AND STANDARDS tbl. In, 938-39 (1996).
131. This is an exam given by the National Conference of Bar Examiners to test the ethics of
potential members of the bar. The exam is required to be taken by the law students in 47 states to
be admitted to the practice of law. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'Rs, THE
MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL RESpoNSiBiLrrY ExAMIATION, 1999 INFORMATION BOOKLET 1-2
(1999).
132. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSioAL CONDUCT Rules 8.1-8.5 (1997).
133. Id. pmbl.
134. Prentice, supra note 1, at 766 n.339.
135. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also COXET AL., supra note 26, at 1022-23.
136. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6.
1999] 1313
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another."137 This shows support,
although not fully accepted in the legal profession, 3 " for allowing client information
to be revealed for the protection of the public at large. In the securities realm, this
could create a duty for attorneys to disclose information if it is likely to result in
fraudulent activity with significant harm to innocent investors.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility went even further in Disciplinary
Rule 7-102(B), which states:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) His client has
... perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall
reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal .... 13
This is a mandate that requires attorneys to rectify their clients' fraud as long as
doing so will not violate attorney-client privilege.
While there are several rules that allow the attorneys to reveal limited information
in certain circumstances, the largest obstacle to increasing the duty of attorneys to
disclose fraud or material nondisclosures to investors is their duty to their clients.
One of the methods developed to ensure that clients reveal all information necessary
to present the best case possible for their defense is attorney-client
confidentiality. 14
0
The securities industry has to some extent attempted to set higher ethical
standards for its bar. The SEC has long admitted that it "does not have the
resources to investigate every instance in which a public company's disclosure is
questionable.' 41 Therefore, the attorneys and other securities professionals are
responsible, at least in part, for policing the system. This policing function needs
to be weighed against the client's interest to allow maximum protection of the
system and the clients. Because of the large responsibility placed on the securities
bar, 42 "[tihe right to appear and practice before this Commission as an attorney is,
like membership in the bar itself, a privilege burdened with conditions."' 43 An
137. Id. (Revised Final Draft, June 30, 1982).
138. Currently, New Jersey and Wisconsin have adopted Rule 1.6 as proposed in their state
codes of attorney's ethics, rather than using the language in the Model Rules. See NEwJERsEY
RUtLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); WIScoNsIN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUcT Rule 20:1.6 (1998).
139. MODEL.CoDE OF PROSSIONL. REsPoNsmi.rrY DR 7-102(B) (1997).
140. See id. Canon 4.
141. Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 113 (1993) (statement of Wtlliam R.
McLucas).
142. These responsibilities are described as the "onerous tasks... peculiarly dependent on the
probity and the diligence of the professionals who practice before it ... [and which the] investing
public must take on faith." James R. Doty, Regulatory Expectations Regarding the Conduct of
Attorneys in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws: Recent Development and Lessons
for the Future, 48 Bus. LAW. 1543,1543 (1993).
143. Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347,371 (1960).
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alternate approach to any judicial changing of the standards is to have the securities
bar set its own standards.'
C. Other Professionals'Responsibilities
At this point, an examination of accountants' liability under Section 10 is helpful
to demonstrate what standard should be used for attorneys. "[T]he Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 adds Section 1 A to the [Exchange] Act,
imposing a duty upon accountants to search for material instances of illegality
during the audit process and report them to management and, if necessary, the
SEC."'45 If an accountant discovers illegal activity by a client that is likely to have
a material impact upon the financial statements, the accountant has an affirmative
duty to report this activity to the management of the corporation, the board of"
directors, and, if the appropriate officials do nothing to rectify the situation, the
SEC.
146
Accountants and attorneys are both professionals who share major
responsibilities for the accurate preparation and disclosure of the Exchange Act
requirements.,4 7 Accountants also have a professional code of ethics, which is
similar, although not identical, to'the attorneys' code. 4 ' However, accountants do
not generally have close ties to their clients and their duties have generally been
assumed to be towards the public as opposed to specific clients. 49 Still, raising the
standard for one professional group supports the argument in favor of stricter
standards across the board.
D. Attorney Liability in Other Sections of the Securities
Acts
Another area that might provide illustrations of what duty attorneys owe the
public is the other provisions of the Security Act and the Exchange Act. Under
section 11 of the Securities Act, a broad range of people may be held liable for
material false statements made in a registration statement. 5 ' Included in the
144. See Doty, supra note 142, at 1555.
145. COXETAL., supra note 26, at 676.
146. See Alan S,. Fox, Auditor's Responsibility Under Section 10A of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, in SECUnrrmsLrrciMATioN 1998, at 693, 696 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
CourseHandbook Series No. B0-0033,1998); Andrew W. Reiss, Note, Powered by More Than
GASS: Section 10M of the Private Securities Reform Act TakesAccountingProfession for a New
Ride, 25HoFSTRAL.RV. 1261,1265 (1997).
147. See supra text accompanying note 142.
148. See AimECANINsT. OF CERTnFE Put.AccouNTAwrs, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1988).
149. See Doty, supra note 142, at 1547.48.
150. SecuritiesAct of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). The Securities Act was intended
to regulate offerings by issuers and initial public offerings, while the Exchange Act focused on
regulation of trading, the exchanges, and the markets. See Securities Act of 1934 §2, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78b (1994); Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5-6, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77f (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes civil liability on account of false registration statements.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
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category of people that may be held liable are the issuer, signers of the registration
statement, main officers and directors, underwriters, and all experts, including
accountants and attorneys."' In Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York discussed the due
diligence defense to section 11 violations."' Due diligence is the standard to which
professionals are held. It imposes an affirmative duty on professionals to perform
a reasonable investigation before their beliefs that there are no false statements in
the registration statement can be found to be reasonable.'53
In Escott, the attorneys of the issuer, the underwriters, and the accountants were
all held liable for their failure to perform a reasonable investigation under the
circumstances." 4 The court went further to state that one of the defendants, Grant,
who was an attorney and a director, would face a higher degree of due diligence
because he was an attorney. The court argued that this would not set an
"unreasonably high standard" but would "require a check of matters easily
verifiable."' 55 This is just one of the many instances where the Securities Act gives
attorneys an affirmative duty to protect investors, perhaps even at the expense of
their clients. 5 This serves to keep the standards of the legal profession high, as
well as protect attorneys from liability. Courts have used this decision to impose
affirmative duties on attorneys to investigate the accuracy of offering statements.
5 7
Another area, which shows a continued desire of the SEC and the courts to
regulate attorneys, is the ability of the SEC to bring aider and abettor actions under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. While the private aider/abettor cause of action
under Section 10(b) has been disallowed under Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver,"'5 the SEC still has the ability to prosecute secondary
participants in securities violations, which tend to be accountants and attorneys."'
E. Other Policy Concerns
A fimal policy concern is the broadening of attorneys' responsibilities and
obligations beyond that which was intended by the drafters of the Securities and
Exchange Acts. While this relates to the purpose for which the statute was enacted,
it also goes to one of the main concerns of securities regulation, the over-regulation,
in some people's opinion, of the securities market. There is a line of scholarship
that states that the mandatory disclosure provisions and excessively detailed
151. See Securities Act of 1933 § 1 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994).
152.283 F. Supp. 643,682-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
153. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
154. See Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 682-703.
155. Id. at 690.
156. Due diligence also serves as protection for the attorneys, so that the information they are
releasing is accurate.
157. See Felts v. National Account Sys' Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 67 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
158.511 U.S. 164 (1994).
159. See supra Part I.B.
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regulations of the SEC are unnecessary for several reasons. 6 ' First, the Securities
Acts were enacted with the goal of protecting investors at a time when individual
investors dominated the market. 6' In recent years, there has been a trend towards
the institutionalization of the market and the argument follows that the large
institutions that dominate the market now do not need the extensive protections that
the SEC and Congress have placed on the market. However, this argument ignores
the roughly fifty percent of investors who are not institutions.'
62
Another argument against increased regulation in the securities market has to do
with the Efficient Market Hypothesis ("EMIT'). The EMH states that the
information about a corporation is already reflected in the price of its securities
before investors can make a profit on it.'6 The EMH appears in three forms: weak,
semi-strong, and strong. The weak and semi-strong theories are widely accepted
and state that previous price information and all currently available public
information is incorporated into the price.'64 The strong theory states that all
information, public or not, is incorporated into the price. 65 While not widely
accepted, the proponents of this theory believe that extensive regulation of the
securities industry is unnecessary because all the information about the stock and
company is already incorporated into the price of the stock.'66 This supports an
argument against increased regulation because regulation will not add anything to
protect investors in the securities market. If all the information is already
incorporated into the price, the disclosure requirements are unnecessary, as are
insider trading laws. 67
A third argument against extending the scope of attorneys' duties and the
regulation as a whole of the securities industry is an argument about competition.
As the market becomes increasingly global, the securities markets around the world
will have to compete for capital, as well as the jobs and opportunities that
accompany it.1'6 The United States has the most burdensome regulations in the
entire world, and the most costly.69 Therefore, as global opportunities increase,
foreign issuers, as well as U.S. companies, will turn towards foreign markets where
160. See FrankRL Easterbrook & Daniel 1L Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
ofInvestors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 692-707 (1984). But see Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable
March Toward a ContinuousDisclosure RequirementforPublicly Traded Corporations: 'Are
We There Yet?," 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135 (1998) (arguing in favor of a more organized
continuous disclosure rule).
161. See Jeny W. Maddum,Protecting the Institutional Investor-Jungle Predator or Shorn
Lamb?, 12 YALE I. ONREG. 345,346-50 (1995).
162. See CoxETAL.,supra note 26, at28 (citing N.Y.S.E. FAcT BOOK 1995, FEDERAL RESERVE
BoARD'LOW OF FuNDs" 57 (1995)).
163. See Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy ofStatutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in
a GlobalizingMarketfor Securities, 97 MICcH- L. REV. 696,732 n.86 (1998); Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinerl Krakmaa, The Mechanisms ofMarketEffciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 552 (1984).
164. See Gilson & Kraakmarn, supra note 163, at 555-56.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 552.
167. There are, however, arguably other reasons for the disclosure requirements.
168. See James L. Cochrane et al.,Foreign Equities and U.S. Investors: Breaking Down the
Barriers Separating Supply andDemand, 2 STAN. 3.1L. Bus. & FiN. 241, 241-44 (1996).
169. See id at 243-44.
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they can raise capital with less expense and time. If more regulation is added to the
already complicated U.S. system, it could worsen the problem and lead to a loss of
the predominance of the U.S. capital markets in the world.
Finally, an argument which occurs everywhere from securities law to
constitutional law is the concern that the judiciary is legislating. The actual text of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in no place mentions a private right of action, let
alone attorneys' liability under such a suit. The judicial gloss on Rule lOb-5 has
become lengthy and confusing and some scholars are wondering if it has anything
at all to do with the original intent of Section 10(b).17
IV. RMEDmIS
With an abundance of tests for duty, it is not clear when attorneys will be held
liable for their actions, and in the process, investors are not being adequately
protected. In order to fulfill the purpose of the Exchange Act, the tests for duty need
to be modified. The current law needs uniformity to adequately protect investors.
The question remains how to best accomplish the goals outlined in Part III with the
tests available in Part II. By examining the current tests in light of these important
issues, a combination of the elements of several of the tests, resulting in a two-part
analysis, seems to yield the best results. Also, any duties that attorneys do have to
third parties must be balanced against their professional responsibilities to their
clients.
This proposed approach, the direct fairness test, calls for a two-part analysis.
First, the court examines whether the defendant meets the direct contacts analysis
of the Sixth Circuit.' Direct contacts require examining the transaction to see the
attorney's role in the deal, interaction with investors, and level of deceit involved.
The Sixth Circuit has stated that "[d]irect contacts may take many forms. An.
accountant or lawyer, for instance, who prepares a dishonest statement is a primary
participant in a violation even though someone else may conduct the personal
negotiations with a securities purchaser."' 2 To determine whether the contacts are
sufficient to satisfy the first half of the direct fairness test, the court examines the
contacts between the parties, the nature of the contacts and their duration. The
analysis turns on whether the defendant is sufficiently connected with the
transaction to support lOb-5 liability.
If the directs contacts portion of the analysis is satisfied, the court then uses a
multi-factor test, similar to the reasonable expectations and flexible duty tests used
in various circuits to determine whether the actions of the defendant are intrinsically
170. For an in depth discussion ofthe problems ofthe federal common law associated with Rule
1 Ob-5, see Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries ofFederal Common Law: The
Merits of Codifying the Private Cause ofAction Under a StructuralistApproach, 1997 U. ILL.
L.Rav. 71.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
172. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1315 n.24 (6th Cir. 1974); see also Rubin v.
Schottenstei Zox &Dunn, 143 F.3d 263,267 (6th Cir. 1998) (en bane) ("'A person undertaking
to furnish information which is misleading because of a failure to disclose a material fact is a




fair. Because the direct contacts test is satisfied, the defendant has a stronger duty
towards the investing public than if the direct contacts test is not satisfied. These
contacts require applying a duty test that is more inclusive than traditional fiduciary
duty tests. If, however, the direct contacts analysis is not satisfied, the defendant has
a lesser duty to the investors and other potential plaintiffs.
The defendant has a duty to the investing public based on whether, looking at the
totality of the circumstances, the defendant's actions are fair to both parties in the
transaction. This is a moral fairness based on the expectations of conduct in
business and in society. The direct fairness test places an emphasis on the
reasonable expectations of the investor while looking at the defendant's reputation
and actions. By emphasizing reasonable expectations, the direct fairness test will
not allow an investor with completely unreasonable expectations to recover. To
evaluate whether the conduct is fair, some of the factors from the reasonable
expectations and flexible duty tests can be used,'" including the benefit to the
defendant, the defendant's awareness ofthe plaintiff's reliance, the defendant's role
in initiating the deal, and the requirements in "an exercise of fair and honest
business practices."' 74 However, the ultimate question is: Are the defendant's
actions fair and reasonable in the situation? Using this analysis, the defendant has
a dutyto be fair and act as a reasonable attorney and; if they do not do so, they have
violated their duty.
There may be several problems in adapting the direct fairness test to all
transactions since its previous use has been limited to face-to-face transactions.
However, several other areas of law focus on the expectations of reasonable
people " and fairness. Case law can be used to establish what a reasonable investor
can expect from securities professionals and, conversely, the standard of care that
a reasonable attorney must use. This solution does not provide immediate certainty,
but it is a step towards increasing the responsibilities of attorneys by creating a
standard more in line with their professional integrity. By using the direct contacts
analysis to determine what level of duty arises out of a transaction, the defendants
are not faced with unlimited liability. In addition, the use of a reasonable
expectations/fairness factor becomes more appropriate because it is more likely that
the plaintiff relied on the attorney, the firm, or its reputation and that the defendant
should be responsible for the loss suffered in connection with that fraud. Also, the
direct fairness test, by focusing on the fairness of the transaction and the
defendant's actions, does not allow attorneys to escape their public duties by relying
on their private obligations. This test is limited to attorneys and other professionals
with obligations to the public because of the special responsibilities their
professions place on them.
However, ifan attorney does not satisfy the direct contacts analysis, there has to
be a stronger relationship found than the general public duties based on intrinsic
fairness. In the case with no direct contacts, there is a balancing test where the court
weighs the public duties of the attorney with the private duties owed to the clients.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 104,113.
174. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1963).




The burden of proof in this case falls on the plaintiff to show that the violation of
public duties outweighs the interests of the particular client. Factors to consider in
this balancing test include the nature of the attorney's conduct, the expectations of
a reasonable investor (what would a typical investor expect an attorney to tell him),
and the client's expectations of confidentiality.
Using the direct fairness test, attorneys are still liable to those investors to whom
they owe a fiduciary duty, but if the attorney demonstrates direct contacts and an
intent to deceive, they have greater obligations to the investing public. These
obligations are based on the intrinsic fairness question and do not allow intentional
misconduct to go unpunished. If, however, the attorney does not have direct
contacts, the public and private duties of the attorney have to be balanced to
determine if the duty to the public clearly outweighs the duty to the particular
client.176
The direct fairness test is superior to relying on the traditional fiduciary duty
approach that is very limited and hardly ever imposes liability on attorneys. This
direct fairness test is also better than the superior information or direct contacts
approaches which have little guidance and can be adopted so that liability for
attorneys would be never ending. The direct fairness test is also superior to the
reasonable expectations and flexible duty tests because it reduces the confusion and
factors. The test has two parts which the court can use to determine if the defendant
acted fairly given all the circumstances because attorneys have a responsibility to
act fairly towards the public.
177
CONCLUSION
By examining the current tests and their ambiguities as well as the policy reasons
for holding attorneys to a higher standard of conduct, it becomes apparent that a
new standard of duty needs to be formulated. A uniform duty test across the United
States will end the controversy about what duties attorneys have and will provide
more certainty in the securities industry. The two-part direct fairness test satisfies
these concerns and brings attorney's legal obligations in line with their ethical
obligations.
176. To summarize, the proposed test has two parts. Did the defendant satisfy the direct contacts
analysis as applied by the Sixth Circuit? If yes, the attorney or other professional has a duty to act
fairly towards the public. To determine whether the defendant's actions are fair, look at (1) the
factors in the reasonable expectations test and the flexible fairness test, (2) concepts of a reasonable
man based on case law developed concerning what a reasonable lawyer would do, and (3) intrinsic
fairness.
If the defendant does not meet the direct contacts analysis, the attorney's duty to her client
generally prevails, although this duty must be tempered by the attorney's responsibilities to the
public. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant's duty to the public clearly
outweighs her duty to her client in this case.
177. See supra Part 1I[.B.
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